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Abstract 
We evaluate the extent to which poor households are able to participate in Payments for 
Environmental Services (PES) scheme using data from a PES scheme implemented at two sites 
in Latin America. This allows us to compare environmental and livelihood impacts of PES 
across regions with different agronomic and socio-economic characteristics. In particular, one of 
our sites is composed almost entirely of poor or extremely poor households, while the other has 
households ranging from extremely poor to very well off. The results show that poorer 
households are in fact able to participate—indeed, by some measures they participated to a 
greater extent than better-off households. Moreover, their participation was not limited to the 
simpler, least expensive options. Extremely poor households had a somewhat greater difficulty in 
participating, but even in their case the difference is solely a relative one. Transaction costs may 
be greater obstacles to the participation of poorer households than household-specific constraints. 
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1. Introduction  
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) schemes pay land users to undertake 
practices that generate external benefits, either to individual users of ecosystem services (such as 
downstream water users) or to society as a whole (Wunder, 2005; Pagiola and Platais, 2007; 
Engel et al., 2008). These payments represent a potential additional income source for land users, 
but will only bring benefits to households that are able to participate. A common fear among 
many observers has been that poorer households would be unable to participate in PES schemes. 
Several studies in Costa Rica, for example, found that many participants in that country’s PES 
scheme are relatively well off (Ortiz et al., 2002; Miranda et al., 2003; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). 
The Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project, implemented at 
sites in Colombia, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica from 2003 to 2008, offers an excellent opportunity 
to examine the ability of poor households to participate in PES. The Silvopastoral Project used 
PES to stimulate the adoption of silvopastoral practices in degraded pastures by paying 
participating households for the biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration services that 
were generated, with financing from the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Unlike many other 
PES schemes, the Silvopastoral Project offered a wide range of participation options, ranging 
from simple and inexpensive land use changes to substantial and complex changes (with 
correspondingly higher payments). That some of the choices offered by the project are complex 
and onerous provides a particularly strong test of poorer households’ ability to participate. 
In this chapter, we evaluate the extent to which poor households were able to participate 
in the Silvopastoral Project’s PES scheme, using data from two of its sites. As the same payment 
scheme was offered in both areas, we are able to compare poor household participation in PES 
under different agronomic and socio-economic conditions. In particular, one site is characterized 
by high levels of poverty, with most households falling below the poverty line, and many below 
the extreme poverty line, while the other site exhibits a very wide range of income levels, 
including both extremely poor and very wealthy farm households. Because of the nature of the 
practices being promoted, we are unable at this time to assess the Silvopastoral Project’s welfare 
impact. What we assess is the threshold issue of ability to participate: if poorer households 
cannot participate, they will not receive any benefits, whether large or small. 
We begin by describing the Silvopastoral Project and the two project sites. We then 
discuss the factors that might hinder poorer households’ ability to participate in PES schemes, 
drawing on the review by Pagiola et al. (2005) and on the rich literature on technology adoption 
by smallholders in developing countries, many of whose lessons are relevant to PES. We then 
use data collected at the study sites to analyze participation patterns, with particular attention to 
participation by poorer households. We first examine the extent to which different groups of 
households participate, and then undertake an econometric analysis to determine the factors that 
affect participation decisions. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for the 
design of PES schemes.1
                                                 
1  Earlier analyses we conducted at these same sites are reported in Pagiola et al., 2007b and 2008. Those analyses 
used data from earlier years (from the first year only, at the Nicaragua site, and for the first three years, at the 
Colombia site). This paper updates those analyses to use the data from all four project years and compares 
results at the two sites. 
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2. The Silvopastoral Project  
The Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project piloted the use of 
PES in three sites in Colombia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua (Pagiola et al., 2004). The project was 
financed by a US$4.5 million grant from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), through the 
World Bank. It was implemented in the field by local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
2.1 PES scheme design 
The Silvopastoral Project used PES to promote the adoption of silvopastoral practices in 
areas of degraded pastures, with the aim of generating biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration services. Silvopastoral practices include (1) planting high densities of trees and 
shrubs in pastures; (2) cut and carry systems, in which livestock is fed with the foliage of 
specifically planted trees and shrubs (‘fodder banks’); and (3) using fast-growing trees and 
shrubs for fencing and wind screens. These practices provide deeply rooting, perennial 
vegetation that is persistently growing and has a dense but uneven canopy.  
The on-site benefits of silvopastoral practices to land users may include additional 
production from the tree component, such as fruit, fuelwood, fodder, or timber; maintaining or 
improving pasture productivity by increasing nutrient recycling; and diversification of 
production (Dagang and Nair, 2003). These benefits can be important, but are often insufficient 
by themselves to justify adopting silvopastoral practices—particularly practices with substantial 
tree components, which have high upfront planting costs and only bring benefits several years 
later. Estimates prepared for the project show rates of return of between 4% and 14% (Gobbi, 
2002). Other studies found similar results; White et al. (2001), for example, found rates of return 
to adoption of improved pasture in Esparza, Costa Rica, of 9% to 12%. These estimates, of 
course, only consider the on-site benefits of silvopastoral practices.  
Because of their increased complexity relative to traditional pastures, silvopastoral 
practices also have important biodiversity benefits (Dennis et al., 1996; Harvey and Haber, 
1999). They have been shown to play a major role in the survival of wildlife species by 
providing scarce resources and refuge; to have a higher propagation rate of native forest plants; 
and to provide shelter for wild birds. They can also help connect protected areas. Silvopastoral 
practices can also fix significant amounts of carbon in the soil and in the standing tree biomass 
(Fisher et al., 1994; Swallow et al., 2007). Both biodiversity and carbon sequestration benefits 
are off-site, however, so land users tend not to include them when they decide which practices to 
adopt. GEF funding for the Silvopastoral Project is based on the desire to secure these 
biodiversity and carbon sequestration benefits.2 Silvopastoral practices can also affect water 
services, though the specific impact is likely to be site specific (Bruijnzeel, 2004). The 
Silvopastoral Project did not include any payments for water services. 
To encourage adoption of more beneficial practices, the Silvopastoral Project offered 
payments that are proportional to the level of services provided. To do so, it developed indices of 
the biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration services that different land uses provide, 
then aggregated them into a single ‘environmental services index’ (ESI).3 The project 
distinguished 28 different land uses, each with its own ESI score, and paid participants according 
to the change in total ESI score over their entire farm area. Remote sensing imagery, followed by 
                                                 
2  In this context the GEF can be considered to be buying services on behalf of the global community.  
3  The ESI is described in detail in CIPAV (2003) and Pagiola et al. (2004). 
4  
on-the-ground verification, was used to develop detailed baseline land use maps of each PES 
recipient household (as well as of members of a control group, see below), indicating the land 
use being undertaken on each parcel. Land use changes in each parcel were then monitored on an 
annual basis, and payments were made on the basis of observed land use changes. 
Silvopastoral practices tend to be unattractive to land users, despite their long-term 
benefits, primarily because of their substantial initial investment and because of the time lag 
between investment and returns. This led to the hypothesis that a relatively small payment 
provided early on could ‘tip the balance’ between current and silvopastoral practice, by 
increasing the net present value of investments and reducing the initial period in which these 
practice impose net costs on land users (Pagiola et al., 2004, 2008). On this basis, participating 
households received payments of US$75 per incremental ESI point, per year, over a four-year 
period.4 Payments were made annually, after on-the-ground verification of land use changes. 
They also received a one-time payment of US$10/point for the baseline points.5  
2.2 Project sites 
The Silvopastoral Project’s sites were in Quindío, Colombia; Esparza, Costa Rica; and 
Matiguás-Río Blanco, Nicaragua (Pagiola et al., 2004). In this paper, we focus exclusively on the 
Quindío and Matiguás-Río Blanco sites. See the appendix for the data sources we used. 
The Matiguás-Río Blanco area is located in the department of Matagalpa, about 140km 
northeast of Managua, on the southern slopes of the Cordillera de Darien. It has an undulating 
terrain, with an elevation of about 300-500m above sea level. Average temperature is about 25°C 
and average rainfall between 1700mm and 2500mm. Participants are clustered in two adjacent 
microwatersheds, that of Río Bulbul and that of Río Paiwas. Farms range in size from 10-30ha to 
a few of over 60ha. Most households are poor, with many falling below Nicaragua’s extreme 
poverty line. 
Land use in Matiguás-Río Blanco is dominated by extensive grazing. As shown in Table 
1, pastures accounted for about 63% of the area prior to project start. Of this, about half was 
degraded pasture, and a little over a quarter had either no or few trees. Annual crops made up a 
very small part of total area. It is noteworthy that about 20% of total area remained under forest, 
mostly along streambanks. It is also noteworthy that silvopastoral practices, though not common, 
were not unknown even before the project: there were some 489ha of pastures with high tree 
density, and 88ha of fodder banks, for example.  
The Quindío area is located in Colombia’s Central Cordillera, in the watershed of Río La 
Vieja, at an altitude of about 900-1,500m above sea level. Average temperature is about 20-25°C 
                                                 
4  The Silvopastoral Project’s use of short-term payments is controversial, as payments in PES schemes should 
generally be on-going. The use of short-term payments means that the conditionality of payments is limited to 
the first few years, which may well affect the long-term viability of the mechanism (Pagiola et al., 2007a). The 
use of short-term payments is not pertinent to the issue considered in this paper, which focuses on the extent of 
participation, and whether poverty affects it. 
5  It is important to note that this initial ‘baseline’ payment was intended as a recognition of the environmental 
services that households were already providing, and not as subsidy to increased service provision. Households 
receiving the baseline payment were under no obligation to participate further. As noted below, however, the 
baseline payment did help finance some of the required investments, particularly in Matiguás-Río Blanco. It 
also played a very important role in establishing trust among participants that they would indeed receive the 
promised payments if they undertook the land use changes the Project was asking for. 
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and average rainfall between 1500mm and 2000mm. Farms range from 10-20ha to some of 50-
80ha. In this former coffee area, many of the larger farms are owned by urban professionals and 
managed by employees (mayordomos).  
Coffee production once dominated land use in Quindío, but it has been replaced by 
pasture in the last decade due to low coffee prices, and now accounts for less than 1% of the 
area. As shown in Table 2, extensive grazing was the main land use in Quindío prior to project 
start. Degraded and treeless pastures dominated the landscape, accounting for about 65% of the 
area. Livestock production is primarily for meat production, with a small proportion being used 
for milk production. Overall tree cover was low, although there was a significant amount of 
forest remnants, most of which was riparian forest. Silvopastoral practices such as pastures with 
trees, fodder banks, and live fences were practically non-existent. Only 7 in 110 farms surveyed 
had any fodder banks, for example, with an average of less than 1ha each.  
Although neither Nicaragua nor Colombia is in the list of top deforesters, both have high 
deforestation rates, particularly Nicaragua. Conditions at the Nicaragua site are broadly 
representative of those observed in many parts of Central America, while conditions at the 
Colombia site are broadly representative of conditions found in parts of Venezuela, Brazil, and 
Ecuador. 
All households in the study sites that met minimal farm and herd size criteria were 
eligible to participate. Participants were selected on a first-come basis until the maximum 
number allowed by available funding was reached. The characteristics of participating 
households are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. At Matiguás-Río Blanco, the average participating 
household is composed of six members and has about 34ha of land and about 23 livestock units.6 
The average per capita income of about C$2,000 is below the poverty line. Other indicators 
confirm the low living standards of the area’s households: few have water or electricity, and 
education levels are very low. Agriculture is the main economic activity, with few households 
having off-farm income. In Quindío, the average household is composed of slightly less than five 
members, and has about 36ha of land and a herd of about 57 livestock units. Average per capita 
income is about COP10 million, but with very high variation across the sample.  
To assess relative participation levels, we classify households at each site into three 
groups based on their estimated income.7 The small size of our sample precluded a finer 
breakdown (for example, into quintiles). In Matiguás-Río Blanco, we use the national poverty 
lines for 2001 (World Bank, 2003), adjusted for inflation, to divide households into groups: those 
with incomes below the extreme poverty line (“extremely poor”), those with incomes between 
the extreme poverty line and the poverty line (“poor”), and those with incomes above the poverty 
                                                 
6  Livestock are converted into livestock units (Unidad Gran Ganado, UGG) using the following conversion 
factors: adult cows, 1.0 UGG; oxen or breeding bulls, 1.55 UGG; calves, 0.33 UGG; yearlings, 0.7 UGG. 
7  We computed household income by adding all income sources reported by participants, including net income 
from agricultural, forest, and dairy production; livestock sales; off-farm work; net income from non-farm 
enterprises; and remittances. Dairy, agricultural, and forest products consumed by the household are included in 
the calculation of income using market prices, and the value of family labor is imputed using local wage rates 
for unskilled labor. Expenditure is generally preferred over income as an indicator of household welfare, as it 
tends to be less variable (Ravallion, 1992). However, the baseline survey only collected data allowing income to 
be computed. Moreover, these data are based largely on information self-reported by the farmers, and so are 
subject to both recall problems and possible biases. These biases are unlikely to affect our results as long they 
are similar across income groups. 
6  
line (“non-poor”). In Quindío, with its much greater spread of income levels, there is a clear 
jump in income levels above 20 million Colombian Pesos (COP), so we group households with 
income above this level into a “high income” group. Below this income level, there is no 
apparent clustering, so we divide the remaining households into two groups of similar size, with 
the division falling at COP2 million. We classify households with income between COP2 million 
and COP20 million into a “middle-income” group, and those with incomes below COP2 million 
into a “low-income” group. About half of the latter group falls below Colombia’s official 
poverty line (World Bank, 2002).  
Breaking down participants into income groups shows both similarities and differences. 
At both sites, poorer households have significantly less land and smaller herds than better-off 
households. Poorer households also have larger households and more dependents per adult, 
although in Quindío the proportion of dependents is highest among middle income households. 
In Matiguás-Río Blanco, differences in educational level and experience are minimal and not 
statistically significant; these differences are much greater in Quindío, but they are also not 
statistically significant. In Matiguás-Río Blanco, average access to services is low, but poorer 
households are less likely to have either electricity or water; in contrast, average access to 
services is high in Quindío, but low income households are less likely to have water services and 
more likely to live further from the nearest village. Particularly important for what follows, 
access to credit and technical assistance is highest among better-off households at both sites, 
although the differences are not significant. The topography of farms is broadly similar across 
income groups at both sites.  
2.2 PES implementation 
The Silvopastoral Project made its first payments at both sites, for baseline ESI points, in 
July 2003. It made its first payment for changes in land use in May 2004. Additional payments 
were made in 2005, 2006, and 2007.  
Tables 1 and 2 compare land use by PES recipients prior to the project and after four 
years of payments. Overall, there was substantial land use change at both sites. In Matiguás-Río 
Blanco, 1,343ha (48% of total area) experienced some form of land use change, while in Quindío 
1258ha (44% of total area) experienced some form of land use change.8 A wide variety of 
changes were observed, ranging from minor changes such as sowing improved grasses in 
degraded pastures to very substantial changes such as planting high-density tree stands or 
establishing fodder banks. The area of degraded pasture experienced the largest fall at both sites, 
being reduced by over 80% in Matiguás-Río Blanco and by over 90% in Quindío. The area 
natural pastures without trees also declined strongly–by a third in Matiguás-Río Blanco and by 
two thirds in Quindío. In Matiguás-Río Blanco, the greatest increase was in the area of pasture 
with high tree density, which increased by 570ha. The area of fodder banks increased by almost 
160ha, and about 210km of live fencing were established. In Quindío, most of the gains were 
experienced in pastures with high tree density, which increased by 334ha. The area of fodder 
banks increased relatively little (from less than 5ha to over 28ha), but that of intensive 
silvopastoral systems (Leucaena planted at 5,000 trees/ha) increased substantially (from 0ha to 
130ha). About 346km of live fencing were established. Overall, these changes increased the total 
                                                 
8  The figures quoted actually under-state the extent of change, as they show net changes. In addition, existing 
silvopastoral practices were often upgraded to more intensive practices (for example, increasing the density of 
trees in pastures). 
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ESI score of PES recipients by 53% in Matiguás-Río Blanco and by 49% in Quindío. Thus 
households in Matiguás-Río Blanco made more substantial changes on a smaller proportion of 
their land than households in Quindío. 
In Quindío, the land use changes undertaken by PES recipients were vastly greater than 
those observed in the control group, among whom less than 13% of land area experienced any 
change, for an increase in ESI points of only 7%. The lack of a proper control group at Matiguás-
Río Blanco prevents a similar comparison, but casual observation suggests that land use changes 
among non-recipients in nearby areas were substantially less extensive, in both area affected and 
degree of change. 
3. Participation in the Silvopastoral Project’s PES scheme  
PES schemes pay land users to maintain or switch to land uses that provide 
environmental services that others value. Participation is voluntary, and participants receive 
payments for doing so. This creates a prima facie presumption that participants are at least no 
worse off by joining than they would be by not joining. Were this not the case, they could simply 
decline to participate. The potential benefits of PES schemes will only be realized by those who 
participate, however. Determining whether poorer households will in fact be able to participate 
in a PES scheme is thus critical to any potential impact such schemes might have on poverty. 
Pagiola et al. (2005) group the factors that might affect a household’s participation in a 
PES scheme into three categories: factors that affect eligibility to participate; factors that affect 
households’ desire to participate; and factors that affect their ability to participate. The three 
categories form a logical sequence: ability to participate only become an issue for households 
that wish to do so, and that in turn is only relevant for households that are eligible to participate.9 
In this paper, we focus on the factors that affect the participation of eligible households, and 
particularly on how they affect the participation of poorer households. 
3.1 Constraints to the participation of poor households in PES schemes 
Eligibility to participate is affected by the scheme’s targeting and by requirements it may 
impose. Costa Rica’s PES scheme, for example, requires that applicants be located in a priority 
conservation area (based primarily on biodiversity criteria) or in a watershed covered by an 
agreement with an individual water user, and to meet a variety of requirements (such as not 
being in arrears with the country’s social security system). It once also required most participants 
to have land titles, but this requirement has been eliminated (Pagiola, 2008). Similarly, Mexico’s 
PES scheme defines eligible areas in terms of their importance to water supplies and other 
criteria (Muñoz et al., 2006). The eligibility of poorer households will thus likely often be an 
important consideration. Pagiola and Colom (2006), for example, find that the areas in 
Guatemala that are important for water service provision do not always have high poverty rates. 
It is not an issue in our study, however, as we focus on areas that were selected for inclusion in 
the project.  
Assuming that a given household is eligible to participate, the next question is whether it 
desires to participate. This is likely to depend primarily on whether it expects to be better off as a 
                                                 
9  Wunder (2008) adds a fourth ‘filter’: whether households are competitive in terms of transaction costs. This 
filter affects whether the PES scheme will select particular households, and thus is closely related to eligibility 
criteria. We return to this issue in the conclusions. 
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result. Participation in PES can be thought of as adopting a particular production technique, 
whose returns include payments from the scheme. The literature on technology adoption and 
program participation thus provides many insights into the factors likely to affect participation 
(Feder et al., 1985). The literature on adoption of agroforestry practices (Pattanayak et al., 2003; 
Mercer, 2004) is particularly pertinent here, as the practices promoted by the Silvopastoral 
Project are very similar. Previous analyses confirm the significance of factors that tend to affect 
the benefits or the costs of participation, such as prices faced, farm characteristics, and the 
opportunity cost of household labor, the fit in the farming system, or the risk involved 
(Pattanayak et al., 2003). Factors such as slope, for example, can affect the extent to which 
productivity is threatened under current practices, thus increasing incentives to adopt land uses 
that are less vulnerable to degradation. As developing-country PES schemes typically offer fixed 
payments per hectare for adopting a given practice, the payment itself is unlikely to differentially 
affect the desirability of participation across households. 
A household may want to participate in a PES scheme and yet be unable to do so, for a 
variety of reasons. Participation in a PES scheme requires adoption of the land uses promoted by 
the scheme. This may be simple and cheap, if the scheme calls for retaining existing land uses 
(as in the Costa Rica scheme’s forest protection contract), or it may be complex and costly, if the 
scheme calls for switching to new practices (as in the PES scheme studied here). Tenure issues 
are often critical, particularly in cases where PES schemes require long-term investments, such 
as reforestation or adoption of silvopastoral practices. Tenure variables were significant in 72% 
of agroforestry adoption studies that included them, with greater tenure security being 
consistently associated with greater adoption (Pattanayak et al., 2003). In Costa Rica, both 
Thacher et al. (1997) and Zbinden and Lee (2005) found tenure-related variables to be highly 
significant in explaining participation in the country’s PES scheme and its predecessors. When 
the new practices to be adopted are complex, access to technical assistance may be an issue. 
Access to extension was found to significantly affect agroforestry adoption in 90% of studies that 
included it (Pattanayak et al., 2003). This was the case in two studies in Costa Rica, for example 
(Thacher et al., 1997; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). Adopting new land use practices may also prove 
difficult if households cannot finance the necessary investment. Savings, remittances, or off-farm 
income may help some households undertake the necessary investments. Assets and credit both 
tend to increase adoption of agroforestry practices, and their role is very often significant 
(Pattanayak et al., 2003). 
Many of the factors that affect a household’s ability to participate in PES may well be 
more salient for poor households. Poorer households are less likely to have secure tenure, tend to 
have fewer savings and less access to credit, and are less likely to receive technical assistance (de 
Janvry and Sadoulet, 2000; López and Valdés, 2000). Whether poor households will be able to 
participate in PES schemes (assuming that they are eligible and interested in doing so) is thus a 
legitimate source of concern. 
3.2 Poor household participation in the Silvopastoral Project’s PES scheme 
The Silvopastoral Project induced substantial land use change at its sites. The question of 
interest here is the extent to which poorer households were able to participate in this success.  
Figures 1 and 2 break down observed land use changes by household income group. At 
both sites, poorer households accounted for a substantial share of land use changes. At Matiguás-
Río Blanco, poor and extremely poor households accounted for 49% of the decline in degraded 
9 
pasture. In Quindío, low income households accounted for 35% of the decline in degraded 
pastures and 45% of the decline in improved pasture without trees. They only accounted for 9% 
of the decline in natural pasture without trees, but this is primarily due to their having the least 
area in this use of any of the income groups.  
Moreover, land use changes by poorer households at both sites were not limited to 
adopting technically simpler and less onerous practices. In Matiguás-Río Blanco, for example, 
extremely poor households established 60ha of fodder banks (38% of the total), and poor 
households another 37ha (23%).10 Extremely poor households also established 153ha (40%) of 
pastures with high tree density, with poor households providing another 78ha (20%). Similarly, 
in Quindío low income households adopted many complex land uses, including 70ha of pastures 
with high tree density and 31ha of fodder banks and intensive silvopastoral systems (Leucaena 
planted at 5,000 trees/ha). Indeed, it was the middle income group that made the simplest 
possible change on almost half of the land they converted, replacing natural with improved 
grasses (mainly star grass, Cynodon plectostachyus) in pastures with no or few trees.  
Tables 5 and 6 examine various indices of household participation across income groups. 
In terms of area converted, poorer households perform poorly at both sites. At Matiguás-Río 
Blanco, non-poor households converted just under 20ha each, on average, almost double the 
10ha converted by extremely poor households, while in Quindío high income households 
converted about 34ha each, over three times the 9ha converted by low income households. It is 
interesting to note, however, that poor (but not extremely poor) households in Matiguás-Río 
Blanco converted practically as large an area as the non-poor (18ha). 
Data on total land use changes by households in each income group are affected by the 
different land endowments of each group, however, making total area converted a poor measure 
of relative participation. The differences across income groups shrink considerably when 
changes are expressed in terms of proportion of farm area converted. In Matiguás-Río Blanco, 
poor households converted the greatest proportion of their farm: 57%, compared to 49% for non-
poor households. Although extremely poor households converted the smallest proportion of their 
farm (42%) of any of the groups, the difference was less marked than in absolute terms. In 
Quindío, high income households converted the greatest proportion of their farms (55%) but low 
and middle income farms were not far behind (40% converted). Moreover, these differences in 
proportion of farm converted are not significantly different (at 5% level). 
Whether expressed in hectares or in proportion of farm area converted, area-based 
indicators fail to measure whether the changes are large or small. Sowing improved pasture 
grasses in a treeless pasture requires substantially less effort than converting it to pasture with 
high tree density, yet will have the same value in terms of either area converted or percent of 
farm area converted. Area-based indicators also omit investments in live fencing. One option to 
incorporate a measure of intensity is to weight the area converted by the ESI of the land use 
change, and then add the points for live fencing. The ESI is not intended as a measure of effort, 
but higher-ESI land uses tend to involve more effort than lower-ESI uses. This measure is also 
appealing as it is the outcome of interest to the buyer of the environmental services being sought. 
The increase in total ESI is the simplest measure (and is readily available, as it forms the basis 
                                                 
10  The popularity of fodder banks among poorer households in Matiguás-Río Blanco may be due to the greater 
availability and lower opportunity cost of labor in such households. The cut-and-carry practices that such banks 
imply require substantial amounts of labor. 
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for payments to participants), but like the area converted it is constrained by total farm size. 
Stating it in terms of increase in ESI per hectare or percent increase in ESI addresses this 
problem. 
In Matiguás-Río Blanco, the increase in ESI points is greatest in absolute terms for non-
poor households, but poor households follow close behind, and the difference is not statistically 
significant. Poor households do even better in proportional change in ESI. Extremely poor 
households trail, but the difference is not statistically significant. Extremely poor households had 
the highest initial ESI/ha, however, so they may have had less scope for substantial 
improvements. In Quindío, the absolute increase in ESI points is smallest for low income 
households and largest for high income households, but in relative terms the 55% increase 
achieved by low income households exceeded the 41% achieved by middle income households 
and rivaled the 67% of high income households. Once again, these differences are not 
statistically significant. 
3.3 Explaining participation decisions 
Examination of observed land use change indicates that poorer households are in fact 
able to participate quite extensively in the Silvopastoral Project’s PES scheme, even though it 
requires some technically complex and onerous land use changes. Participation rates by poorer 
households are broadly similar to those of better off households at both sites—lower by some 
measures, but higher by others. To shed further light on participation decisions and the factors 
that may affect them, we undertook econometric analyses of participation rates at both sites. 
The literature on adoption decisions usually looks at the binary choice of whether or not 
to adopt a given practice, using cross-sectional data on adopters and non-adopters, and the effect 
of different factors on the probability of adoption (Pattanayak et al., 2003). This approach is not 
relevant in our case because project funding limited the number of participants and because a 
binary adoption/non-adoption choice would fail to capture the nature of participation in the 
project. Rather than participation per se, what is of interest here is how household characteristics 
affect the intensity of participation, with a particular focus on whether poorer households are less 
able to participate than better-off households. Our approach is similar to that of Nkonya et al. 
(1997), who examined the intensity of adoption of improved seed in Tanzania using continuous 
variables (hectares planted with improved maize seed or amount of fertilizer applied per hectare 
of maize), and of Rajasekharan and Veeraputhran (2002), who examine the share of farms using 
intercropping in Kerala, India. 
We run five different regressions for each site, using the indices of participation 
discussed earlier (area converted, share of farm converted, absolute change in ESI points, percent 
change in ESI points, and change in ESI points/ha). Similar to Rajasekharan and Veeraputhran 
(2002)11, we employed a one-tailed Tobit to model farm area, as this variable is restricted to non-
negative values. Likewise we employed a two-tailed Tobit model to model the percentage of the 
farm area converted, as this ranges between 0 and 100. Change in ESI, change in ESI per 
hectare, and percent change in ESI can take any value, and so are modeled using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). 
                                                 
11  Rajasekharan and Veeraputhran (2002) employed a one-tailed Tobit to study the adoption of intercropping in 
three regions in Kerala, India using the share of farm area under intercropping as the dependent variable. 
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Our choice of explanatory variables draws on the factors identified by Pagiola et al. 
(2005) as likely to affect participation in PES, and by Pattanayak et al. (2003) and the studies 
they cite as likely to affect adoption of agroforestry practices, as discussed below. The number of 
explanatory variables that could be included was limited by the relatively small sample size at 
both sites. In this case, increasing the sample was not an option: our data include every single 
PES recipient at both sites. Fortunately, the small size of the sites means that many potential 
explanatory variables vary little across households, and thus can be safely omitted. 
Tables 7 and 8 present the estimation results for the two sites.12 The first two columns in 
each table report the results of Tobit models for area changed and proportion of farm changed, 
and the last three columns the results for the OLS models for change in ESI, percentage change 
in ESI, and change in ESI per hectare. Measures of model fit are relatively low, but this is not 
surprising with cross-sectional data, particularly when sample sizes are small. They are 
comparable to those obtained by Rajasekharan and Veeraputhran (2002) and Ervin and Ervin 
(1982).   
The first group of independent variables examines the effect of farm characteristics. 
Many previous studies report a positive effect of farm size on adoption of various practices, 
which has been interpreted as indicating higher flexibility of the farming system or the existence 
of economies of scale (Rajasekharan and Veeraputhran, 2002; Thacher et al., 1997; Nowak, 
1987). At our sites, farm area is positively associated with intensity of adoption measured in area 
converted at both sites, but has a small and non-significant impact on most other indicators of 
participation. This suggests that the correlation between farm size and area converted is simply 
due to larger farms having more area to convert.  
Labor availability would seem likely to be important, although it is not often significant 
(Pattanayak et al., 2003). We include a measure of the hours per week worked on the farm. 
Family labor is significant and positive in the farm area model in Quindío, but gives non-
significant results in the farm share and ESI models, and in all the models in Matiguás-Río 
Blanco. This is not surprising, as the relationship between land use change and labor use is 
complex: switching to higher ESI land uses does not necessarily increase labor use. Interestingly, 
the age of the household head has a consistent, statistically significant negative impact on 
intensity of participation in all models in Matiguás-Río Blanco, but generally small and non-
significant impacts in Quindío. Other studies have often found a positive effect, though rarely a 
significant one and have generally attributed it to experience reducing the risk of adoption 
(Pattanayak et al., 2003); an alternative explanation, and one consistent with the Matiguás-Río 
Blanco results, is that older farmers may be less inclined to make changes. Whether households 
were male-headed did not have a significant impact on participation at either site under all 
formulations.   
The second group of independent variables concerns factors likely to affect the 
profitability of adoption. As our study areas are small (particularly Matiguás-Río Blanco), most 
                                                 
12  OLS models were tested for heteroscedasticity in the error distribution using the Breusch-Pagan test. Results for 
these tests rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity of errors, which if ignored would result in the lost of 
optimality of the OLS estimator (Greene, 2000; Mittelhammer et al., 2000). In the absence of prior information 
about the structure of the heteroscedasticity, we used the OLS estimator with White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix estimator (White, 1980). We found no evidence of either moderate or strong 
muticollinerarity in any of the regression models using the Belsley et al. (1980) diagnostics in OLS models and 
the Belsley (1991) diagnostic in the Tobit models. 
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farms face similar prices for inputs and outputs, and have similar yield potentials. The 
profitability of the various silvopastoral practices should thus be broadly similar throughout each 
area. Farmers with lower accessibility will tend to face higher input costs and lower output prices 
at the farm gate. Indeed, we find that distance from the nearest village has a significant negative 
impact on the extent of area converted in Quindío, though the impact on ESI is not significant. In 
Matiguás-Río Blanco, where distances are smaller but roads are worse, whether farms have year-
round access had strong positive impacts on changes expressed in ESI, but not on area-based 
indicators.  
The proportion of the farm on flat terrain has a negative impact in Quindío, but it is not 
significant except in some of the ESI models. In Matiguás-Río Blanco we expressed this variable 
as a proportion of the farm on hilly terrain, but found it not to be significant in any model. In 
general, there is no strong a priori reason to expect a particular sign on topography variables. 
Land on steep slopes may benefit more from silvopastoral practices in that it is more vulnerable 
to degradation under traditional extensive grazing. On the other hand, the cost of implementing 
practices may be higher.  
In Quindío, herd size has a significant positive impact in the ESI models but not in the 
area models, suggesting that its impact is primarily through its demand for fodder rather than 
through its contribution to financing. 
The third group of independent variables includes factors that have been hypothesized to 
affect the ability of households to participate in the scheme.13 The ability to finance the 
necessary investments is one potential obstacle. To examine whether initial investment costs 
affect ability to participate, we include variables a measure of assets in the Quindío analysis. In 
Matiguás-Río Blanco, where initial assets vary relatively little, we use access to credit, measured 
as a binary indicator of whether a household had access to credit during the five years prior to 
project implementation.14 We also include off-farm income, measured as the income share of 
off-farm jobs held by all household members. Off-farm income can be a financing source for 
investment in new practices, but can also result in a higher opportunity cost of labor.  
In Matiguás-Río Blanco, both access to credit and off-farm income had a positive impact 
on intensity of participation in every model, although only that of off-farm income was 
significant. The non-significance of credit is surprising, given the cost of implementing some of 
the practices promoted by the Silvopastoral Project and the low income levels of most 
households. The first-year survey of participants provides the explanation for this result: most 
households, even in poor areas such as Matiguás-Río Blanco, have a variety of ways of finance 
investments (Pagiola et al., 2008). Some investments were undertaken entirely with family labor 
and so did not require financing. Unsurprisingly in a livestock-producing area, the sale of 
animals was the most frequently mentioned source of funds (61% of all households). The 
project’s initial ‘baseline’ payment also played an important role for many households (53%). 
Although almost no households mentioned off-farm income as a source of financing, it is 
                                                 
13  Within these factors, tenure is not an issue at either site, as both were selected partly for the absence of such 
problems. 
14  The endogeneity of credit was tested using the Wu-Hausman and Hausman tests in the OLS models and the 
Smith-Blundell test in the Tobit models. Exogeneity of credit was not rejected in any model at the 90% 
confidence level. 
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possible that such income contributed primarily through its contribution to savings, which was an 
important source of financing for 41% of households. 
In Quindío, household assets had a very small but negative sign, in all formulations, but 
they are not significant. Off-farm income had a mostly negative, but also not significant, effect 
on adoption intensity in Quindío. These results are consistent with an interpretation of off-farm 
employment increasing the opportunity cost of labor. Savings were the most often cited source of 
financing for first-year investments in Quindío, followed by animal sales; baseline payments 
played a very small role, probably because low initial ESI points meant that these payments were 
small.  
The technical difficulty of adopting silvopastoral practices is the other main potential 
obstacle to household participation. To test the importance of this factor, the project provided 
technical assistance (TA) to a randomly-selected subset of PES recipients. The results were 
strikingly different across the two sites. In Matiguás-Río Blanco, access to the project’s TA 
wasn’t significant under any formulation, while in Quindío it was significant under every 
formulation. The explanation for the lack of significance in Matiguás-Río Blanco is probably 
twofold: first, as noted above, silvopastoral practices were already relatively well known in the 
area prior to the project. Second, the very small size of the site probably made it much easier for 
households who did not receive TA directly to learn from their neighbors who did. In contrast, 
silvopastoral practices were practically unknown in Quindío prior to the project, and the larger 
spatial size of the site (and, hence, the much lower density of recipients in the overall farm 
population) made TA play a much more important role. 
The strongest result in the Quindío models is that being a PES recipient has a large 
positive impact on the extent of adoption of silvopastoral measures, irrespective of how adoption 
is measured. This confirms the observed sharp contrast in land use change between PES 
recipients and control group measures, and indicates that the contrast was not due to self-
selection of strongly motivated land users into the scheme or to differences in characteristics 
across groups. The Matiguás-Río Blanco results also show a strong positive impact of being a 
PES recipient, but given the concerns over the quality of the control group we cannot treat this 
result as more than suggestive. 
As poverty is multidimensional, we also include dummies for the income groups, with 
the best-off income group omitted, to capture other aspects of poverty that may not be captured 
by the previous variables. These dummies show some interesting patterns at both sites. In 
Matiguás-Río Blanco, poor (but not extremely poor) households have higher levels of 
participation than non-poor households in every model. Extremely poor households, on the other 
hand, have lower levels of participation than non-poor households in terms of area converted and 
in most ESI models. None of these differences is statistically significant, however. These results 
confirm the patterns seen in Table 5. In Quindío, both the low income and the middle income 
group dummies have a mix of positive and negative coefficients, but except in one case the effect 
isn’t statistically significant. This suggests that income level has relatively little impact on 
participation that isn’t already captured by other variables (such as farm size) which may be 
correlated with poverty. The only significant impact is that middle income households convert a 
lower share of their farm than high income households. This may well be due to that group using 
a portion of their farm for other productive activities – indeed, low income households actually 
expanded the area under shade-grown coffee to a small extent, and replaced part of their 
monoculture fruit crop areas with diversified fruit crops. 
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4. Conclusions 
Can poorer households participate in PES scheme? The experience of the Silvopastoral 
Project in both Matiguás-Río Blanco and Quindío indicates that they can. Not only did poorer 
households participate quite extensively, but by some measures they participated to a greater 
extent than better-off households in Matiguás-Río Blanco. Participation by poorer households 
was somewhat lower in Quindío, but the differences were not statistically significant. Even the 
poorest households at both sites participated at high rates in the project. And again their 
participation was not limited solely to the simpler and cheaper practices. These results are 
particularly strong in that the Silvopastoral Project imposes much greater burdens on participants 
than most PES schemes. They bode well for the prospects of poor households being able to 
participate in PES schemes financed from Reduced Emissions for Deforestation or Forest 
Degradation (REDD) payments, as these schemes are likely to focus on much simpler and less 
costly forest conservation measures.  
This conclusion obviously needs to be approached with some caution. It is possible that 
the high levels of participation by poorer households are due to self-selection bias: only those 
households able to participate may have joined. We believe this is unlikely, for two reasons. 
First, the project offered a very wide range of participation options, including many that are not 
very onerous, even for poorer households. Indeed, households could in principle have done 
absolutely nothing; they would then have received the baseline payment but would not have 
received any payment beyond that. In fact, no household chose that route. Second, many non-
participating households at both sites wanted to participate as well, but were prevented from 
doing so by the project’s own limits on the number it could accept. But even if there were some 
self-selection at play, it is significant that in a poor area such as Matiguás-Río Blanco there are 
many poor households—including many extremely poor households—that are able to participate 
in a PES schemes, and even to undertake expensive and technically challenging land use 
practices.  
Nevertheless, one should not jump to the sanguine conclusion that all poor farm 
households everywhere will always be able to participate in PES schemes.15 Both PES schemes 
and local conditions differ from case to case, and there may well be cases where otherwise 
eligible poor households may find it difficult or impossible to participate. Indeed, results at both 
sites show that the poorest households – although by no means shut out – do appear to have had 
greater difficulty in participating as intensively as better-off households.  
Our detailed results help us identify several specific factors that tend to affect 
participation. This information can help design PES schemes to reduce potential obstacles to the 
participation of poorer households. There is little that a PES scheme can do about poorer farms 
being less accessible, but it can do something about financing constraints and technical 
difficulty.  
The significance of credit underlines an important potential constraint for poorer 
households. This constraint will not always be present in PES schemes. When schemes require 
maintaining existing practices—as in the majority of contracts in Costa Rica’s scheme, for 
example, and as in prospective REDD-financed schemes—there are few or no investment 
                                                 
15  It is also important to recall that this case study does not speak to possible differences in eligibility to 
participate, due to spatial considerations or tenure problems. Pagiola and Colom (2006) find that the areas in 
Guatemala that are important for the provision of water services do not always have high poverty rates. 
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requirements.16 Financing constraints may be important when land use changes are required for 
participation, however, as in Costa Rica’s Reforestation or Agroforestry contracts. Our results 
suggest that this constraint is not absolute, as it is sometimes made out to be. Even poor 
households such as those in Matiguás-Río Blanco often have a variety of ways to finance 
profitable investments. Nevertheless, it is likely that poorer households will have fewer such 
alternatives: fewer savings, fewer assets that might be sold, worse access to credit. Providing 
some initial financing (such as the baseline payment made by the Silvopastoral Project) may be 
desirable for PES schemes that involve initial investments in areas with many poor households.17
Our results also highlight the need to understand whether TA may be required. The need 
for TA appears to be linked more with prior experience than with poverty, however. When PES 
schemes require participants to adopt relatively well known practices, TA may be of minor 
importance. Conversely, when participation requires adoption of practices that are not widely 
used, even relatively well off households such as those in Quindío may need TA.  
The availability of multiple options in the Silvopastoral Project may well have 
contributed to high participation by poorer households, as they were able to choose the options 
that work best for them, in light of their particular constraints. When there are multiple ways of 
providing a service (or different levels of a service), it makes sense to offer multiple ways in 
which households can participate, as long as transaction costs do not increase unduly. It is 
interesting to note, however, that at our sites the poorest households did not choose the cheaper 
and easier land uses – in fact, it was the better off households that did so in Matiguás-Río 
Blanco, and the middle income group that did so in Quindío. 
In general, transaction costs are likely to be a bigger threat to the participation of poorer 
households in PES schemes then their own ability to participate (Pagiola et al., 2005). Our 
results illustrate this. As can be seen in Table 6, low income households in Quindío converted 
40% of their farms, on average, and increased their ESI score by about 55%. These participation 
rates are not far below those of high income households, who converted 55% of their farms and 
increased their ESI score by 67%. But from the perspective of the service buyer, what matters is 
the total absolute increase in environmental service generation (whether proxied by area, as is 
commonly the case, or by more sophisticated measures such as the ESI), and the unit cost of 
achieving it. The cost, in turn, has two components: the cost of the payment, which is identical 
for a given increase in ESI for all households, and the transaction cost of contracting with each 
household. This second cost is likely to be largely fixed per household, irrespective of farm size. 
Thus high income households converted a total of 342ha and achieved a total increase in ESI of 
259 points. At first glance, the results for low income households appear similar: they converted 
a total of 283ha and achieved a total increase in ESI of 242 points. The number of low income 
households is much larger, however, so on a per contract basis, the comparison is less favorable: 
low income households converted 9.4ha and increased ESI by 8.1 points per contract, while high 
income households converted 34.2ha and increased ESI by 25.9 points per contract. It takes more 
than three contracts with low income households, therefore, to achieve the same results as a 
single contract with a high income household. Very similar relationships can be seen in the 
                                                 
16  Even forest conservation may require out-of-pocket expenditures by participating households, for example to 
fence off forests receiving conservation contracts or undertake measures to prevent forest fires. These costs are 
much lower, however, than those that they would face if land use changes were required. 
17  Costa Rica frontloads payments under its timber plantation contract for this reason. Frontloaded payments, 
however, introduce other problems, as they reduce the conditionality of the scheme. 
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Matiguás-Río Blanco case (Table 5). Thus, the larger the transaction costs, the more attractive it 
will be for PES schemes to focus on large land holdings. As farm size tends to be highly 
correlated with income, in practice this will mean focusing on better-off households. This is not a 
purely hypothetical concern: In Ecuador, the PROFAFOR scheme has decided to adopt a 50ha 
minimum size for the forest plantations from which it buys carbon sequestration services 
(Wunder and Albán, 2008). 
Keeping transaction costs low—in addition to being desirable in itself—is thus 
imperative if poorer households are not be shut out of many PES schemes.18 But the smaller 
farm size of many poor households means they will always have relatively higher transactions 
costs. It is thus important to attempt to devise mechanisms to overcome them. Costa Rica, for 
example, experimented with collective contracting, under which groups of small farmers joined 
the country’s PES scheme collectively rather than individually, thus spreading transaction costs 
over a large group. This approach ran into problems, however, as non-compliance by a single 
group member resulted in payments being halted to all members. The approach has thus been 
revised to process the applications of such groups together, but then issue individual contracts; 
this avoids the partial compliance problem, but has much smaller savings in transaction costs 
(Pagiola, 2008). This is clearly an area in which more work—and some imaginative solutions—
will be necessary. This is also an area in which development aid could be used to leverage PES 
schemes by providing support to the participation of poorer households, and in particular by 
underwriting some of the transaction costs involved. 
 
                                                 
18  The Silvopastoral Project as presently conducted is a poor example of this, as it has relatively high monitoring 
costs dictated in part by its pilot nature and in part by the need to distinguish small differences in land use so as 
to compute ESI scores. Work is underway under the project to determine the nature of the tradeoff between 
monitoring costs and effectiveness.  
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Appendix: Data sources 
To examine participation decisions, we used three data sets. The first is the baseline 
survey conducted in October-November 2002, during project preparation. This survey included 
very detailed information on household characteristics. A second survey of participants was 
conducted in March-May 2004, after the first year of project implementation. This survey 
collected information on land use changes that occurred in the intervening period. The 
questionnaires for the surveys are available from the authors on request.  
Information from these two surveys was complemented with detailed land use data for 
each farm, derived from maps prepared annually by the project between 2003 and 2007 for each 
farm using remote sensing imagery. Quickbird imagery with a 61cm resolution was used, 
providing very high levels of detail. Land use maps for each farm derived from these images 
were then extensively ground-truthed to match each plot to one of the 28 different land uses 
recognized by the project. These maps provide accurate and consistent measures of area.  
Both the baseline and follow-up surveys included a control group, as does the mapping 
dataset. The main intended purpose of this group was to attempt to distinguish project-induced 
land use changes from changes induced by other factors (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006). In an 
earlier paper (Pagiola et al., 2008), we found that control group members in Matiguás-Río 
Blanco differed from PES recipients in many important characteristics (such as income, farm 
size, or herd size), as so we decided that using the control group would not be useful. We retain 
the Matiguás-Río Blanco control group here to ease comparability with the Quindío analysis, but 
caution against placing much significance in differences between the control group and PES 
recipients. 
At the beginning of the project, US$1=C$14.25 and US$1=COP2,670. All exchange rates 
and inflation adjustments are based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database. 
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Table 1: Land use among Silvopastoral Project PES recipients, Matiguás-Río Blanco, 
Nicaragua 
(ha, unless otherwise noted) 
Before project 
(2003)  
Year 4 of project 
(2007) 
Land use 
Environmental 
services index 
(points/ha) (ha) (%)  (ha) (%) 
Infrastructure, housing, and roads 0.0 11.4 0.4  14.8 0.5 
Annual crops 0.0 212.0 7.6  78.6 2.8 
Degraded pasture 0.0 780.6 28.0  147.6 5.3 
Natural pasture without trees 0.2 43.0 1.5  27.9 1.0 
Improved pasture without trees 0.5 22.6 0.8  25.6 0.9 
Semi-permanent crops 0.5 37.0 1.3  18.8 0.7 
Natural pasture with low tree density  0.6 279.3 10.0  231.5 8.3 
Fodder banka 0.8 79.8 2.9  238.9 8.6 
Improved pasture with low tree density 0.9 134.4 4.8  213.6 7.7 
Natural pasture with high tree densityb 1.0 338.1 12.1  522.4 18.7 
Diversified fruit cropsa 1.1 18.5 0.7  23.8 0.9 
Monoculture timber plantation 1.2 1.1 0.0  4.7 0.2 
Improved pasture with high tree densityb 1.3 151.3 5.4  537.8 19.3 
Scrub habitats (tacotales) 1.4 137.7 4.9  134.3 4.8 
Secondary and riparian foresta 1.7 543.2 19.5  569.8 20.4 
Total area  2,790.0 100.0   2,790.0 100.0  
Live fence (km) 1.1 115.8    325.5  
Notes: Totals may not add up because of rounding 
Land uses recognized by the project but not found at this site are omitted.  
Includes land use by PES recipients only. 
a Similar land uses with small areas have been aggregated; ESI shown is for use with largest area. 
b The project distinguishes land uses with recently planted trees from the same land uses with mature 
trees for the purpose of computing the ESI score; here these land uses have been aggregated to their 
mature state, and the corresponding ESI score is shown. 
Sources: ESI score from Silvopastoral Project manual (CIPAV, 2003); land use from Silvopastoral Project, based 
on analysis of remote sensing imagery verified in the field 
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Table 2. Land use among Silvopastoral Project PES recipients, Quindío, Colombia 
Before project 
(2003) 
Year 4 of project 
(2007) 
 
Environmental 
services index 
(points/ha) (ha) (%)  (ha) (%) 
Annual crops  0.0 37.9 1.3  37.2 1.3 
Degraded pasture 0.0 78.3 2.7  7.1 2.7 
Natural pasture without trees 0.2 721.5 24.9  239.5 24.9 
Improved pasture without trees 0.5 1,078.8 37.3  873.0 37.3 
Semi-permanent crops (plantain, sun coffee) 0.5 184.1 6.4  148.4 6.4 
Natural pasture with low tree density (< 30/ha) 0.6 6.2 0.2  10.4 0.2 
Diversified fruit crops 0.7 73.7 1.9  59.7 1.9 
Fodder banksa 0.8 4.6 0.0  27.5 0.0 
Improved pasture with low tree density (< 30/ha) 0.9 54.8 2.5  333.4 2.5 
Natural pasture with high tree density (>30/ha)b 1.0 0.0 0.2  67.9 0.2 
Shade-grown coffee 1.3 23.5 0.8  33.8 0.8 
Improved pasture with high tree density (>30/ha)b 1.3 2.2 0.1  266.5 0.1 
Bamboo (guadua) forest 1.3 43.9 1.5  52.6 1.5 
Timber plantationa 1.4 0.0 0.0  5.5 0.0 
Scrub habitat (tacotales) 1.4 48.8 1.7  42.0 1.7 
Riparian forest 1.5 369.2 12.8  392.8 12.8 
Intensive silvopastoral system 1.6 0.0 0.0  130.2 0.0 
Primary and secondary foresta 2.0 165.7 5.7  165.7 5.7 
Total area  2,893.2 100.0  2,893.2 100.0 
Recently established live fence (km)  1.4   255.5  
Multistory live fence or wind break (km)  0.7   92.9  
Notes: Totals may not add up because of rounding. 
Includes all land in farms of PES recipients. 
Land uses recognized by the project but not found at this site are omitted.  
a. Similar land uses with small areas have been aggregated; ESI shown is for use with largest area.  
b. The project distinguishes land uses with recently planted trees from the same land uses with mature 
trees for the purpose of computing the ESI score; here these land uses have been aggregated to their 
mature state, and the corresponding ESI score is shown. 
Sources: ESI from CIPAV (2003); land use from Silvopastoral Project mapping data. 
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Table 3: Characteristics of participating households, Matiguás-Río Blanco, Nicaragua 
PES recipients 
Variable 
Extremely 
poor Poor 
Non-on-
poor All 
Control 
group 
Entire 
sample 
Income per capita ('000 C$) -2.9ab 4.2ac 15.8bc 4.5 -7.5 2.0 
Assets ('000 C$) 7.3 11.7 2.6 6.8 21.4 9.8 
Farm area (ha) 23.7b 30.9 40.1b 30.3d 48.2d 34.0 
Cattle (livestock units) 13.7b 14.0c 32.8b 19.8d 36.8d 23.3 
Hilly topography (% farm area) 16.2 15.0 24.9 18.7 23.0 19.6 
Water (% with water service) 20.5b 21.1 41.4b 27.2 25.0 26.7 
Electricity (% with electric service) 2.3b 0.0c 17.2bc 6.5 16.7 8.6 
Access by road all year round (%) 79.5b 84.2 96.6b 85.9d 100.0d 88.8 
Paved road (%) 6.8 10.5 20.7 12.0 20.8 13.8 
Family labor (hours/ha/week) 5.4ab 3.1a 3.1b 4.2 3.4 4.0 
Household size (members) 7.7ab 6.2ac 4.8bc 6.4d 5.1d 6.2 
Dependency ratio (children per adult) 1.0ab 0.6a 0.6b 0.8 0.7 0.8 
Experience (years) 10.0 13.7 13.3 11.8 10.0 11.4 
Education of household head (years) 2.3 3.4 3.1 2.8 3.8 3.0 
Male headed household (%) 86.4 94.7 96.6 91.3 87.5 90.5 
Off-farm work (% with off-farm employment) 22.7 26.3 10.3 19.6d 4.2d 16.4 
Off-farm income (% of total income) -0.8 0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 
Non-farm enterprise (% owners) 18.2 10.5 24.1 18.5d 4.2d 15.5 
Technical assistance (% with current access) 25.0 31.6 31.0 28.3d 12.5d 25.0 
Notes: a,b,c,d, indicate means are significantly different in paired t-test at 10% test level. Extremely poor < C$2943; 
poor >=C$2943, < C$5639; non-poor >= C$5639. Children are household members under 12. 
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Table 4: Characteristics of participating households, Quindío, Colombia 
PES recipients 
Variable 
Low 
income 
Middle 
income 
High 
income All 
Control 
group 
Entire 
sample 
Income per capita (million COP) -0.7ab 7.0ac 39.9bc 8.2 14.3 10.0 
Assets (million COP) 4.8ab 8.8a 17.9b 8.4 8.7 8.5 
Farm area (ha) 23.3ab 49.2a 62.1b 40.2d 25.4d 36.0 
Cattle (livestock units) 44.3a 77.4b 184.2ab 60.1 48.5 56.8 
Flat (% farm area) 19.1 25.9 24.5 22.9d 36.9d 26.9 
Distance to nearest village (km) 7.9a 7.2 4.3a 7.1d 5.24d 6.6 
Water (% with water service) 90.0a 96.9 100.0a 94.4 96.6 95.0 
Farm resident (%) 36.7 22.0 40.0 30.6 17.2 26.7 
Family labor (man-days/ha/yr) 11.1a 7.4b 3.1ab 8.3 nd nd 
Household size (members) 5.2a 4.9b 3.6ab 4.9d 3.7d 4.5 
Dependency ratio (children per adult) 0.25a 0.55a 0.36 0.40d 0.22d 0.35 
Age of household head (years) 46.8ab 40.7a 38.7b 42.9 43.9 43.2 
Literacy of household head (%) 96.7 93.8 100.0 95.8 93.1 95.1 
Education of household head (years) 4.0a 5.2 8.6a 5.2 4.3 4.9 
Off-farm work (% with off-farm employment) 10.0 15.6 20.0 13.9 10.3 12.9 
Technical assistance (% with current access) 33.3 34.4 50.0 36.1d 10.3d 28.7 
Credit (% with access to credit) 23.3 25.0 40.0 26.4 13.8 22.8 
       
Number of observations 30  32  10  72  29 101 
Notes: a,b,c,d indicate means are significantly different in paired t-test at 10% test level. nd = no data. Low income 
< COP2 million; middle income >= COP2 million, < COP20 million; high income >= COP20 million. 
Children are household members under 12 
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Table 5: Participation rates among PES recipients by income group, Matiguás-Río Blanco, 
Nicaragua 
Live fencing Environmental services index Total 
land 
Change in 
land use Increase  (total points)  (points/ha) 
Income group (ha)  (ha) (%) 
Initial
(km) (km) (%) Initial Increase  Initial Increase
Change
(%) 
Per household:              
Extremely poor 23.7  10.0 42.2 0.93 1.96 212 19.0 7.9  0.80 0.33 41.6 
Poor 30.9  17.7 57.4 1.24 2.32 N/A 21.4 15.3  0.69 0.50 71.4 
Non-poor 40.1  19.5 48.8 1.77 2.73 154 28.4 16.0  0.71 0.40 56.1 
All 30.3   14.6 48.2  1.26 2.28 181  22.5 12.0   0.74 0.39 53.2 
Total area:         
Extremely poor 1,041.9  440.1 42.2 40.81 86.44 212 837.0 348.5  0.80 0.33 41.6 
Poor 586.5  336.6 57.4 23.53 44.02 187 407.3 290.7  0.69 0.50 71.4 
Non-poor 1,161.6  566.8 48.8 51.46 79.20 154 824.9 462.6  0.71 0.40 56.1 
All 2,790.0   1,343.5 48.2  115.80 209.66 181  2,069.3 1,101.8   0.74 0.39 53.2 
Notes: Totals may not add up because of rounding. 
Sources: Computed from Silvopastoral Project mapping data. 
 
 
Table 6: Participation rates among PES recipients by income group, Quindío, Colombia  
Live fencing Environmental services index Total 
land 
Change in land 
use  (total points)  (points/ha) 
Income group (ha)  (ha) (%) 
Initial 
(km) 
Increase
(km) Initial Increase  Initial Increase
Change
(%) 
Per household:             
Low income 23.3  9.4 40.4 0.02 3.62 14.6 8.1  0.63 0.35 55.3 
Middle income 49.2  19.8 40.3 0.04 5.38 34.2 13.9  0.69 0.28 40.7 
High income 62.1  34.2 55.0 0.04 6.55 38.4 25.9  0.62 0.42 67.3 
All 40.2  17.5 43.5 0.03 4.81 26.6 13.1  0.66 0.33 49.4 
Total area:             
Low income 698.8  282.5 40.4 0.49 108.71 437.4 241.7  0.63 0.35 55.3 
Middle income 1,573.3  633.8 40.3 1.21 172.03 1,093.1 444.8  0.69 0.28 40.7 
High income 621.1  341.6 55.0 0.37 65.54 384.5 258.7  0.62 0.42 67.3 
All 2,893.2   1,257.9 43.5  2.07 346.28  1,915.0 945.2   0.66 0.33 49.4 
Notes: Totals may not add up because of rounding. 
Sources: Computed from Silvopastoral Project mapping data. 
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Table 7: Estimation results, Matiguás-Río Blanco, Nicaragua 
Dependent variable 
 
Area 
changed 
(ha) 
Proportion 
of farm 
changed 
(%) 
Change in 
ESI 
(points) 
% change 
in ESI 
Change in 
ESI per ha 
Independent Variable Model: Tobit Tobit OLS OLS OLS 
Constant -1.085 41.370*** 54.572 0.137 -8.310**
 (3.997) (9.622) (35.037) (0.110) (3.883) 
Farm area (ha) 0.374*** 0.068 0.176 0.002 0.410***
 (0.075) (0.094) (0.318) (0.001) (0.081) 
Family labor (hours/week/ha) -0.039 -0.219** -0.612 -0.003** -0.105 
 (0.072) (0.109) (0.380) (0.001) (0.075) 
Livestock units -0.080 0.314 -0.355 -0.000 0.076 
 (0.165) (0.566) (1.456) (0.006) (0.170) 
Age of household head (years) -0.203** -0.583*** -1.779*** -0.005** -0.169**
 (0.084) (0.152) (0.620) (0.002) (0.082) 
Male-headed household (1=yes, 0=no) 1.792 -1.548 14.579 0.079 3.283 
 (2.750) (4.725) (18.895) (0.048) (2.675) 
Year-round access by road (1=yes) -0.783 3.860 36.796** 0.145** 3.263*
 (2.703) (5.853) (17.804) (0.061) (1.784) 
Hilly topography (% farm area) -0.004 0.073 -0.021 0.000 -0.035 
 (0.023) (0.053) (0.204) (0.001) (0.026) 
Access to credit (1=yes) 2.127 5.998* 12.713 0.079* 2.304 
 (1.546) (3.261) (14.034) (0.043) (1.481) 
Income share of off-farm job 0.081** 0.235** 1.970*** 0.012*** 0.188***
 (0.040) (0.103) (0.389) (0.001) (0.041) 
Technical assistance from project (1=yes) -1.114 -2.147 -6.648 -0.058 -1.616 
 (1.650) (3.652) (13.664) (0.043) (1.541) 
PES recipient (1=yes) 7.579*** 11.744*** -7.395 0.103* 6.548**
 (2.432) (4.548) (17.829) (0.059) (2.534) 
Poor (1=poor) 1.753 1.797 18.599 0.075 3.465 
 (2.392) (5.287) (22.324) (0.066) (2.421) 
Extremely poor (1=extremely poor) -2.700 -5.444 -0.962 0.004 -1.761 
 (1.812) (4.252) (15.576) (0.057) (1.941) 
      
R2   0.016 0.092 0.527 
Pseudo R2 0.639 0.211    
Number of observations 116 116 116 116 116 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; robust standard errors for OLS coefficients. 
*, **, *** indicates coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at 90%, 95%, or 99% confidence 
level. 
 
26  
Table 8: Estimation results, Quindío, Colombia 
Dependent variable 
 
Area 
changed 
(ha) 
Proportion 
of farm 
changed (%) 
Change in 
ESI 
(points) 
Change in 
ESI 
(%) 
Change in 
ESI per ha 
Independent Variable Model: Tobit Tobit OLS OLS OLS 
Constant -20.433* 26.779 -12.931** 45.900 0.255*
 (10.755) (20.745) (6.375) (29.207) (0.141) 
Farm area (ha) 0.423*** -0.005 0.181*** -0.366*** -0.002***
 (0.070) (0.054) (0.036) (0.097) (0.000) 
Livestock units 0.052 0.004 0.087*** 0.306*** 0.002***
 (0.036) (0.044) (0.020) (0.086) (0.000) 
Family labor (adults/ha) 9.844** 21.615 3.886 10.923 0.065 
 (4.451) (14.450) (2.747) (19.461) (0.103) 
Age of household head (years) 0.119 0.024 0.098 -0.210 -0.002 
 (0.089) (0.254) (0.062) (0.341) (0.002) 
Male-headed household (1=yes, 0=no) 6.202 17.067 1.858 -21.439 -0.065 
 (3.837) (10.597) (2.306) (20.936) (0.074) 
Distance to nearest village (km) -0.447* -1.407*** -0.205 -0.428 -0.006 
 (0.242) (0.517) (0.179) (0.946) (0.005) 
Flat topography (% farm area) -0.028 -0.083 -0.016 -0.263** -0.001**
 (0.043) (0.088) (0.030) (0.126) (0.001) 
Assets (1,000 COP) -0.000* -0.001** -0.000 -0.001* -0.000*
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Income share of off-farm job 3.602 -6.877 -0.286 -22.742 -0.136 
 (8.430) (29.262) (5.106) (42.335) (0.287) 
Technical assistance from project (1=yes) 7.957** 18.360** 6.355*** 42.998*** 0.294***
 (3.110) (8.259) (1.547) (11.031) (0.059) 
PES recipient (1=yes) 2.850 9.350 3.630** 15.007 0.079 
 (1.961) (5.995) (1.504) (12.790) (0.065) 
Low income (1=low income) 0.774 -11.424 0.905 2.824 -0.020 
 (6.144) (8.509) (4.315) (13.441) (0.068) 
Middle income (1=middle income) 0.054 -14.135* 0.680 3.445 0.008 
 (5.782) (7.726) (3.843) (11.200) (0.060) 
      
R2   0.794 0.298 0.382 
Pseudo R2 0.83 0.22    
Number of observations 101 101 101 101 101 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **,*** indicates coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero at 90%, 95%, or 99% confidence 
level. 
 
Figure 1: Land use change during Silvopastoral Project, by income group, Matiguás-Río Blanco, Nicaragua 
 
Source: Authors’ computations from Silvopastoral Project mapping data. 
 
28  
 
Figure 2: Land use change during Silvopastoral Project, by income group, Quindío, Colombia 
 
Source: Authors’ computations from Silvopastoral Project mapping data. 
 
 
 
